This paper considers the introduction of a contaminant into a water supply system using a backflow attack. The recent development of techniques for water network sectorization, aimed at improving the management of water systems, is also an efficient way to protect networks from intentional contamination and to reduce the risk of the dangerous effects of network contamination. Users can be significantly protected by isolated district meter areas (i-DMAs) in the water network and the closing of the gate valves by a remote control system to implement such i-DMAs in cases of malicious attacks. This study investigates the effects of different approaches for water network partitioning and sectorization to protect networks using a technique for designing i-DMAs that is compatible with hydraulic performance and that is based on graph theory and heuristic optimization.
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INTRODUCTION
Water distribution networks are exposed to different potential sources of accidental and intentional contamination (US EPA ). Accidental contamination is related to occasional bad source water quality, malfunctioning chlorine stations, pipe breaks, and leak repairs, whereas intentional contamination concerns malicious attacks represented by the intentional introduction of a contaminant at the network sources, the injection of a contaminant in a network pipe (Nilsson et al. ; Clark et al. ) , or the backflow that occurs when a pump system is utilized to overcome the local pressure at the insertion point (Kroll ) . Water contamination from terrorist attacks is a major risk for society and can have serious consequences, such as poisoning users or spreading infectious diseases; many countries adopted guidelines for water quality monitoring and emergency action plans after 11
September 2001 (HSPDs ; US EPA , ; CER
).
A malicious act may consist of the introduction of chemical, biochemical, microbiological, or radioactive contaminants in the water supply network. When a water supply network contamination incident is identified, three main actions should be performed: (1) alert users not to use the contaminated water; (2) close the sector of the network to limit health risks; and (3) remove the contaminant.
Early warning is crucial for the first action to be successful, whereas the effectiveness of the second action depends on the possibility of closing pipes to disconnect network sectors. Early warning requires a good distribution of fast warning sensors over the network (Kroll & 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this section, the definitions of the contamination incident characteristics are first described. 
Backflow attack
The backflow attack scenario was borrowed from Di Nardo et al. (b, e) . Specifically, the backflow is created with a pump -a piece of equipment that is easy to find on the market -that can introduce the contaminant into the water system by overcoming the local pressure at the insertion point and disseminate the contaminant into the network. The simulations were carried out by modeling the sub-network and water demands that occur in a typical building, allowing the case study to define the critical contaminant volume to achieve the malicious attack.
The malicious attack is carried out at a single point and,
theoretically, by a single terrorist equipped with a small number of simple devices (e.g., a small pump and a backpack to transport the pollutant) that would allow him or her to commit the crime unnoticed.
A backflow attack can be easily accomplished by mixing cyanide with water in a bathroom tub in any house and pumping the solution into the water network.
The introduction point can be anywhere in the system. The most dangerous introduction points to the users can be identified by employing the EPANET2 water quality tool. A water network can be assimilated to a simple weighted graph considering G ¼ (V,E), where V is the set of n vertices (or nodes) and E is the set of m edges (or pipes). Denotingω i as the positive weights with i ∈ V and ϵ ij as the non-negative weights with ij ∈ E and ϵij ¼ 0 if ijÏE, a k-way graph partitioning problem consists of parti- Step c consists of simulating the malicious attack, as described in the previous section, by using the water quality This methodology can be applied to not only intentional and severe contamination but also accidental and less severe contamination caused by poor source water quality, accidental backflows, or other similar problems that can occur in a water distribution system.
CASE STUDY
The real water distribution network of the city of Mata- interconnects the water sources and tanks. Three large water tanks are used in the city (two of these tanks have a capacity of 4,000 m 3 , and the other one has a capacity of 3,800 m 3 ).
The main characteristics of the Matamoros water distribution network model are reported in Table 1 .
After the hydraulic simulation (step a) was carried out with an hourly pattern of the daily water usage with the average and peak water demand reported in Table 1 • S WNP1 with weights ϵ j ¼ γq j ΔH j and
, where m i is the subset of pipes j incident to node i;
• S WNP2 with weights ϵ j ¼ γq j ΔH j and ω i ¼ P m i j¼1 V j =2, where V j is the volume of water in each pipe j incident to node i;
• S WNP3 with weights ϵ j ¼ γq j ΔH j and ω i ¼ Q i (water demand at ith node).
Then, the results for N eu , N eu50 , and L ep for the following scenarios were compared: To reduce the number of exposed users N eu50 , each S WNP was defined after step e in the flow chart in Figure 1 , and then, step b was revisited after changing the weight of the nodes according to the methodology proposed by Di Nardo et al. (a).
As reported in Di Nardo et al. (b, e), the choice of closing the contaminated DMA 1 h (at 8:00 a.m.) or 3 h (at 10:00 a.m.) after the beginning of the malicious attack is a reasonable hypothesis for a water network that is not equipped with an EWS (allowing for shorter detection times). In this case, a realistic assumption is that the authorities are alerted and ordered to close the network district several hours after the attack. In this work, a further (worse) case was simulated by closing the contaminated DMA at 12:00 p.m. (5 h after the first malicious attack).
In Tables 2 and 3 , the three different scenarios of S WNP and S NND are compared using the PIs computed with both the average and peak water demands. In the first case (average water demand), h mean is equal to 17.67 m for S WNP1 , 17.55 m for S WNP2 , and 18.03 m for S WNP3 , similar to the original h mean value of S NND equal to 18.31 m; in contrast, h min is equal to 11.02 m for S WNP1 , 8.60 m for S WNP2 , and 8.98 for S WNP3 , slightly lower than the h min value of S NND equal to 12.58 m. Then, the alteration is negligible with reference to the third scenario, S WNP3 , in terms of the resilience deviation index (I rd ¼ 0.16%). In addition, the number of nodes where h is less than h min90 , which equals 90% of h min , was computed and indicated with the label n 90 ; this value was extremely low in all cases (n 90 ¼ 1 for S WNP1 , n 90 ¼ 56 for S WNP2 , and n 90 ¼ 30 for S WNP3 ) compared to the total number of nodes n (equal to 1,283).
The situation is different in the second case (peak water demand) because, as reported in Greco et al. () , in a network with a low original resilience index I r , the water system has a 'low availability' to change its original layout by the insertion of gate valves without a decrease in hydraulic performance. Indeed, in the case study, the reduction of the is reported in Table 4 . The values for S WNP1 exhibit a high reduction (À65.83%) of N eu but a low reduction with an isolation delayed until 12:00 p.m., the contaminant travels further in the network, and the number of exposed users increases; in this case, the mean N eu increases to À84.30%, but this value is always lower than the value for the original network.
The simulation results for S WNP2 are compared in Table 5 . For the case of S WNP2 with no DMA isolation, N eu50 is negligible with a value equal to À5.32%, similar to WNS provides a significant reduction in affected users in the three scenarios, as reported in Table 5 , with closures after 1, 3, and 5 h, with a higher mean value of N eu50 than S WNP1 for all closure times: À99.46% at 8:00 a.m., À90.28% at 10:00 a.m., and À78.05% at 12:00 p.m. The mean value of N eu is quite similar to the value of N eu50 , reaching À97.83% at 8:00 a.m., À81.59% at 10:00 a.m., and À77.93% at 12:00 p.m.
The simulation results for S WNP3 are reported in Table 6 , which confirms that the partitioning measures alone enable a high reduction of N eu (À58.02%) but a low reduction of N eu50 (À16.67%), although this performance is better than the performance in the previous scenarios. The WNS scenario exhibits a significant reduction in risk: the mean value of N eu50 is À99.87%, À86.03%, and À69.37% for security measures initiated at 8:00 a.m., 10:00 a.m., and 12:00 p.m., The diameter of each circle is proportional to the number of exposed users; therefore, a larger diameter indicates a larger N eu corresponding to the individual node. The worst insertion points that produced the maximum N eu for each scenario were obtained, and Figure 3 illustrates that the cyanide contamination is extremely high in the network without any WNP (gray circles) and that the simple WNP S WNP only slightly reduces the number of exposed users (black circles). Another effect shown in Figure 3 is the movement of cyanide in the network, with the contaminated nodes changing considerably.
The worst insertion points that produced the maximum N eu50 for each scenario were obtained, and as shown in from the malicious attack provides better protection: the black circles are small in Figure 5 , illustrating a value of N eu with a reduction up to À98.95%, and the number of N eu50 is even equal to À100%, as reported in Table 7 .
Figure 5 presents a significant reduction in the protection of the water network by isolation 3 h after the first attack (at 10:00 a.m.), with an important difference between the gray and black circles for N eu and a reduction equal to À41.97%, but with a larger reduction of N eu50 equal to À83.21%, as illustrated in Figure 6 with a small number of 
CONCLUSIONS
Hydraulic and water quality simulations indicated that network protection can be achieved by DMA partitioning and sectorization; the latter may significantly decrease contaminant propagation and protect a greater part of the users from cyanide ingestion. The study, carried out on a large water network, confirmed the following insights of a previous study carried out by Di Nardo et al. WNP reduces the risk because several points of contaminant introduction would be needed to produce a wide negative impact on the network. Then, the work also provides some new insights. The WNP respects the criterion of 'dual-use value' as a technique for water protection because this approach can be implemented to also achieve other management aims.
In this logic, the study indicated that different WNPs allow different solutions to be chosen to optimize performance or protection; in this study, network partitioning obtained with weights equal to the dissipated power of pipes and water demands on nodes, S WNP3 , displayed the best PIs and had high levels of protection.
This study was focused on the problem of an intentional contamination of a large water supply network; therefore, the methodology can also be applied to an accidental contamination (i.e., from arsenic, which is often present in some Mexican cities and, to a lesser extent, in Italian supply networks). In this case, the benefits of WNS are evident because only a small part of the network can be disconnected, minimizing problems or inconvenience for other users. 
